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Abstract 
Mounting concerns regarding the corruption of the clinical research enterprise by the pharmaceutical industry, as well as 
demonstrations of the inappropriateness of traditional research designs and consequent clinical guidelines to direct 
application to patient care, have led to challenges to the integrity of the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. 
However, the emerging crisis of confidence in clinical research should be seen as a threat to the viability of the entire 
healthcare system, not simply to EBM. Efforts of the EBM movement to represent itself as the brokers and mediators of the 
clinical research-healthcare interface are impediments to a full appreciation of the dilemma. Recognizing the implications of 
contrasting epistemological stances regarding the relationship of clinical research findings to healthcare policy and practice 
is essential to maximizing the value of research to the healthcare system. A synergy between empiricism-rationalism 
epistemologies, particularly conspicuous within the EBM movement, is identified as an important philosophical barrier to 
achievement of this goal. The notion of an evolutionary hierarchy of knowledge and wisdom is proposed as a vehicle to 
demonstrate a social constructivist alternative to a dualistic epistemology. Contrasting examples of social constructivist and 
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From weather forecasts to the results of national elections 
to the latest headlined research, we live in a time of major 
uncertainty. Fabricated information in the guise of 
electronically disseminated news reports has contributed to 
an environment in which factual assertions such as the 
annual calculation of the average global temperature seem 
challengeable. Former chairman and CEO of the Cable 
News Network Walter Isaacson recently suggested in an 
interview with CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour that the 
ability to “apply facts to received wisdom” may be 
undermined by the politicization of news and factual 
information [1].  
The erosion of confidence in factual information within 
the social and political sphere has its parallel within 
healthcare. Driven by continued exposures of deceptive 
practices in clinical research, mounting skepticism 
regarding the credibility of trial results on effectiveness of 
medical therapeutics has generated a pileup of publications 
challenging the practical usability of clinical research [2-
8]. Completing the parallelism to the aforementioned 
developments in the social and political sphere individual 
and commercial agendas drive many of the instances of 
falsification and misrepresentation of research reports. In 
one particularly egregious case, an investigative meta-
analysis determined that published, manufacturer 
sponsored, trial reports on effectiveness of the anti-
depressant drug roboxetine had excluded up to 74% of 
eligible and enrolled patients from the published results 
[9]. When the data from these patients were incorporated 
into the analysis, the apparent benefit of the drug was 
eliminated [9,10].  
Fraud and misrepresentation by researchers and 
manufacturers are not the only challenges to the value of 
clinical research within the healthcare system. Boyd et al. 
[11] demonstrated that the framework of clinical trials, as 
it has emerged over the past half century, results in 
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disease-specific clinical guidelines that are incapable of 
addressing the needs of patients with multiple health 
conditions.  Such individuals have already become the 
most commonly encountered patients in many practice 
settings. Boyd et al. [11] showed that clinical guidelines 
passing current quality standards characteristically 
generate sets of recommendations that are impractical, if 
not outright dangerous.  Other investigators have reported 
similar results [12]. Although attempts are underway on 
the part of guideline developers and methodologists to 
define ways of mitigating the dilemma [13], it may take 
decades for the clinical research enterprise to develop a 
body of research information that conforms to the reality of 
clinical practice.  
In the face of such abuses and challenges, some authors 
have gone so far as to blame the evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) movement for contributing to the consequent 
dilemma and to claim that EBM is a movement in crisis 
[2,3]. The plausibility of such arguments is dependent on 
one’s preferred definition of EBM. Previous commentaries 
have proposed that the term EBM should be used to refer 
to the medical education initiative that was launched in 
1992 in the pages of the Journal of the American Medical 
Association [14]. The principal focus of the initiative was 
to increase research literacy among clinical practitioners, 
thereby empowering them to exercise their own critical 
judgment in the application of information from research 
to healthcare decision-making [15,16]. By this non-inflated 
definition of EBM, the latter is not culpable for the 
extremes to which researchers and manufacturer sponsors 
of clinical research have gone in recent years to maximize 
academic currency and product sales. Indeed, the EBM 
movement has made valuable contributions to immunizing 
consumers of research against the discoverable aspects of 
manufacturer and researcher subterfuge [17], even if 
literacy education remains powerless against  non-easily-
discoverable misrepresentation.   
An alternative, expanded, definition of EBM, uses the 
term to denote virtually the entire interface between the 
clinical research enterprise and the healthcare system 
[4,18]. Within this minimally bounded vision of EBM, 
which, depending upon one’s predilections might be called 
either “Everything Bad in Medicine” or “Everything Better 
in Medicine”, commentators have held EBM responsible 
for the breakdown in integrity of research information 
[15,19]. The latter perspective consistently leads to 
unfocused discussions about the problems of the healthcare 
system [16]. It also impedes the ability to focus upon the 
epistemological controversies in which narrowly defined 
EBM has played a central role and which are the focus of 
the current paper. 
 
 
Not a Crisis in “EBM” 
 
It is important to be clear on one crucial point.  Although, 
as mentioned, EBM as originally framed in 1992 [14], as a 
result of overreach in its formulation, has served as the 
center of an important epistemological debate [20], it has 
done so not primarily because of the actual content of the 
initiative, but because the debate itself corresponds to 
much deeper issues that have prevailed within the 
healthcare arena both before and since. It is these issues, 
which center on the importance and role of fact in shaping 
healthcare policy and practice, that are thrown into crisis at 
the point that confidence in the empirical domain of 
relevant fact is threatened. Historically, two factors have 
contributed to the perception of EBM as an amorphous 
“meta-entity”, confounding attempts to locate it within a 
coherent epistemological critique. Firstly, the term 
“evidence-based” itself was immediately recognized as a 
compelling marketing and branding label for healthcare 
initiatives and products emerging in the 1990’s. This 
aspect was well described by David Eddy, who had 
himself earlier coined the phrase to describe a research 
oriented approach to development of clinical guidelines 
[21].   
The second factor that lent EBM its ‘larger than life’ 
countenance was its tendency to over-reach. Over the 
years, EBM as a brand served as the basis of the careers of 
a number of individuals who ultimately became highly 
prominent as a result. It has appeared to serve the interests 
of such individuals to list things as ‘accomplishments of 
EBM’, such as the CONSORT initiative [22] and the 
original impetus behind evidence-based clinical guidelines 
[23], that were achieved by individuals who had no 
affiliation or identification whatever with the EBM 
movement [4,18]. It is within the resulting context that the 
boundaries between EBM, the use of clinical research in 
healthcare and the research enterprise itself, have become 
blurred in the literature [15] and that others have claimed 
to perceive a ‘crisis in EBM’ [3]. However, the actual 
crisis being spawned by the declining confidence in the 
integrity of clinical research is much better understood as 
one of the healthcare system itself and its ability to validly 
“apply facts to received knowledge and wisdom”.  To call 
it a “crisis in EBM” is merely to propagate the excesses 
and over-reaches of that movement. 
One set of authors with ties to the British Medical 
Journal (BMJ), but not otherwise connected to the EBM 
movement, seems to have recognized that the crisis of 
confidence in research is external to EBM in its origins, 
even though their article implies that EBM is a principal 
casualty of that crisis [5]. Their prescriptions for 
remedying the corruption of clinical research are 
reasonable in themselves. However, many of them, such as 
strengthening drug and device regulation, may be 
considered to already have been shown to have failed. 
Others, such as “increasing the systematic use of existing 
evidence”, are poorly elaborated in the “manifesto” 
document [5] and also seem to beg the question of the 
undermining of confidence. What neither the BMJ authors 
nor those from the EBM movement itself appear to 
recognize is that the erosion of believability of verifiable 
facts from research generates a crisis within healthcare of a 
nature that must be referred to the domain of epistemology. 
While regulatory ‘fixes’ may be transiently useful, a viable 










The Epistemological Riddle 
 
As already suggested, EBM was not the cause of the 
current crisis in confidence in clinical research and should 
not itself be considered to be its principal casualty. 
Additionally, EBM is not a convincing candidate to 
provide a resolution for the crisis. Firstly, the tools of 
critical appraisal of published clinical research developed 
at McMaster University Canada [14] are inherently 
incapable of uncovering the kind of subterfuge reflected in 
the roboxetine affair [9]. More challenging still are the 
dilemmas posed by patient multi-morbidity and the failure 
of clinicians to follow even the most rigorously developed 
clinical guidelines [24-26]. These likely require approaches 
that reflect an epistemology that is qualitatively beyond 
that of the EBM movement.  Loughlin et al. [27] recently  
commented on an interesting solution to a dilemma that 
resulted when an author in search of a new medical 
discipline was confronted by contradictions inherent in an 
empiricist ideology [28]. The author in question posed a 
rationalist solution to the conundrum. I suggest that this 
constituted an example of a more general phenomenon. 
Specifically, when empiricism, particularly the extreme 
form known as positivism, runs up against an impasse, it 
magically transforms itself into its polar opposite, 
rationalism, and devises a structured formulaic solution to 
the dilemma.  
For example, trial reports and systematic reviews that 
pool together the results of individual trials for the purpose 
of securing the most precise estimates of effect possible for 
specific outcomes, sometimes present those results with a 
minimum of interpretation. Indeed, editors of major 
journals often discourage investigators from making 
unequivocal recommendations based upon their results, no 
matter how strong. A possible consequence of letting 
results of research ‘speak for themselves’ is the observed 
fact that training in critical appraisal and other aspects of 
teaching use of research reports for problem solving 
purposes, over several decades, has had no measurable 
impact on clinical practice [29,30]. Faced with such 
findings, a characteristic response from the empiricist 
camp is to construct ornate formulations of 
recommendations for practice such as “evidence-based” 
clinical guidelines. Structured step-wise algorithmic 
formulas for practice  are highly suggestive of a 
rationalistic approach to problem solving in which pre-
fixed abstract formulas are substituted for improvised and 
tailored navigation of empirical challenges. In other words, 
rationalism serves as a ‘bailout’ for a positivist 
philosophical stance at the point that the latter fails to 
deliver observed fact in a form that allows its translation 
into knowledge and knowledge into wisdom. It should be 
emphasized that this tendency is quite ubiquitous within 
the healthcare system in its troubled relationship to the 
world of research. The issues around the EBM movement 
are useful as examples that illustrate the overall dilemma. 
Returning to the relationship between corruption of 
factual information from clinical research and the potential 
starvation of knowledge and wisdom that may result from 
it, it is necessary to define an understanding of the 
interrelationship between these complex domains. Doing 
so in an explicit fashion allows meaningful discussion of 
the relationship between clinical research and healthcare.  
Figure 1 illustrates an admittedly over-simplified 
conceptual model of the relationship between data, 
information and knowledge and between all of these and 
the domain of wisdom. The relationship is characterized by 
each successive stage in the escalation subsuming the 
content of all of the prior stages. Hence, quantitative data 
points, such as recorded for each human subject in the 
course of a clinical trial, are carried into the succeeding 
phase of information through a process of analysis based 
upon pattern recognition, prior hypothesis and consequent 
interpretation. Similarly, the interpreted results of studies, 
that is, information, are brought to bear on the domain of 
knowledge, within which a much more complex process 
integrates and socially constructs “justified true belief”, to 
use a classic aphorism. Hovering above the whole and 
drawing nourishment from all of the phases of the prior 
escalation, is the tree of wisdom within which the 
successes and failures of prior knowledge are adjudicated 
and determinations of things such as social justice and 
transformative actions are made. Clearly, if data are 
falsified or corrupted through erroneous selection, 
information is transformed into the equivalent of “fake 
news” and the belief upon which knowledge depends is no 
longer justified. Under such circumstances, the tree of 
wisdom withers and dies. If we take the content of Figure 1 
as an organic whole, it can be seen as a prototype of what 
we might call an ‘evolutionary hierarchy’. This requires 
some explanation which I will briefly provide before 
concluding with some illustrative examples. 
 
Figure 1 The evolutionary escalation of 
successively nested domains feeding 
knowledge and wisdom, respectively. Each 
successive domain subsumes the entire 
content of those that are lower in the hierarchy. 
The domain of wisdom embodies the full 
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A Hierarchy of Hierarchies 
 
The term ‘hierarchy’ has suffered abuse and misuse in the 
course of debates over EBM ideology in the past several 
decades. However, it corresponds to a concept that is quite 
crucial to a discussion of the interplay between research 
findings and healthcare policy and practice. Hence, we 
need clarification regarding its use. Firstly, the term has 
several accepted usages. For example, ‘hierarchy’ may 
refer to an arbitrary ranking among elements, such as an 
‘organizational’ or ‘political’ hierarchy.  Hence, a King 
may be an idiot, but nonetheless secure in his position as 
Head of State at the top of a regal hierarchy by virtue of his 
blood line. On the other hand, one may speak of a 
‘conceptual hierarchy’ in which an underlying ordering 
principle is at play. In the case of the ‘hierarchy of 
evidence’, notoriously advanced early on in the course of 
the EBM movement [31,32], such an ordering principle 
was based on perceived susceptibilities to bias, or threats 
to ‘internal validity’, embedded in particular clinical 
research designs. Within this scheme, appropriately 
concealed randomization, which, assuming a sufficiently 
large study population, maximizes the likelihood that 
confounders of the estimates of effect, known and 
unknown, will be equally distributed across the study 
groups belongs at the top. Designs involving greater 
implicit susceptibilities to such confounding are positioned 
at lower levels.    
The design-based conceptual hierarchy of evidence 
posed by EBM advocates in the 1990’s, although not 
without its opponents [33], served as a commonly 
encountered element in discussions of clinical research 
evidence in relationship to clinical guidelines, as well as in 
other contexts. Less commonly appreciated, but perhaps 
even more important, was the conceptual hierarchy of 
knowledge posited at the dawn of the EBM movement 
itself. The index publication of EBM of 1992 [14] 
proposed a hierarchy of medical knowledge in which 
evidence from research occupied the upper rung followed 
by pathophysiological knowledge and then by knowledge 
based on clinical experience [34]. For some, this 
hierarchical re-ordering of the basis of healthcare 
knowledge triggered the longstanding controversy and 
push-back against the EBM movement [35]. They, at least 
intuitively, recognized the pitfalls of the radical empiricist, 
or positivist, commitment of that movement which the 
ordering principle embedded in the EBM hierarchy of 
knowledge reflected. The proposed scheme prescribed that 
easily verifiable or refutable facts (clinical research 
evidence) were to be placed at the top, followed by more 
complex inferences born of empirical observations of 
biological and physiological systems in health and disease 
(pathophysiological knowledge). At the very bottom came 
empirically unverifiable (from a positivist standpoint) 
inferences generated by the complex domain of clinical 
practice. The latter are comprised of the experience of a 
clinician informed by years of training admixed with the 
inputs of individual patients, their ailments and life stories. 
Contemporary critics intuited that, from a social 
constructivist perspective, the positivist re-ordering of 
informants of clinical decision-making needed to be turned 
on its head (or perhaps restored to the original position), 
with the social and relational processes that ideally 
generate healthcare decisions at the top and information 
from clinical research at the bottom [35]. Over time, 
discerning observers of the ensuing process began to catch 
up to the early critics [34].  
The foregoing summary describes in pure form two 
distinct conceptual hierarchies, one pertaining to research 
evidence and the other of knowledge related to clinical 
decision-making. They were occasionally posited by the 
EBM movement in that form. More commonly, however, 
they were mixed together in a much more confusing 
fashion as a kind of chimera in which research designs 
such as randomization were admixed with knowledge 
elements such as ‘clinical expertise’ or ‘opinion’. Such 
formulations abound in recent editions of standard EBM 
textbooks [36-38]. A recent summary of the 
accomplishments of the EBM movement [18] lists “clinical 
expertise” at the very bottom of a ‘hierarchy’ that 
commences with randomized trials.  
Summarizing the presentation of a ‘hierarchy of 
hierarchies’, we have, in ascending degree of usefulness to 
the issue at hand, hierarchy as an arbitrary ranking of 
related elements, as a conceptual ordering of related 
elements and as an evolutionary escalation of increasingly 
complex forms within a domain. Of these, the latter, such 
as illustrated in Figure 1, is compatible with a social 
constructivist epistemological framework and allows an 





Two examples illustrate the contrast between a rationalistic 
solution to the perceived inadequate use of research in 
healthcare and an approach reflecting social constructivist 
principles. They will be described only briefly here. The 
first can be seen as an extreme example of an attempted 
rationalist solution to the failure of a radical empiricist 
educational movement to increase uptake of research in 
clinical practice. EBM, as a medical education 
intervention, has had substantial impact on curricula at 
both undergraduate and graduate levels. EBM skills have 
been widely incorporated into the competency-based 
curricular frameworks of medical education throughout 
North America and Europe. However, after almost three 
decades since the initiative was announced [14], it remains 
impossible to demonstrate that the teaching of EBM skills 
to physicians in training has had any impact on clinical 
practice [29,30]. Faced with this reality and with other 
compelling evidence [39], many, if not most, of the 
surviving founders of the EBM movement have turned 
their efforts in the direction of development and 
implementation of clinical guidelines. The Grading of 
Recommendations, Assessment, Development and 
Evaluation (GRADE) project, which started as an initiative 
to reform and upgrade earlier systems for grading 
healthcare recommendations in clinical guidelines [40], has 
more recently ballooned into an effort to encompass the 
entire process of development and implementation of 
guidelines within all levels of the healthcare system.   





The GRADE approach to evaluating the quality of 
research supporting the choice of interventions in specific 
settings of disease and prevention goes beyond the 
simplistic design-based hierarchies that characterized 
guideline development in the 1980’s and 1990’s and will 
not be reviewed in detail here [41]. More relevant is how 
the project is being expanded in an attempt to encompass 
all of the social processes involved in healthcare decision-
making within a formulaic and algorithmic framework. 
The “evidence to decision” framework involves navigation 
of a checklist of over one hundred and forty items aimed at 
guiding the process that leads from the finished tables of 
evidence pertaining to particular therapeutic options and 
desired outcomes to the formulation of recommendations 
regarding practice and policy [42]. Perhaps most telling is 
the term “evidence to decision”, which subtly suggests that 
the social processes that lead to healthcare actions and 
choices are shaped consequent to the findings of research 
rather than by the needs and exigencies of patient and 
practitioner problems and concerns.     
Another feature of the GRADE system also supports 
the foregoing perception. In the course of defining how 
strong versus weak recommendations are to be interpreted, 
GRADE prescribes that in the former case, when the 
recommendations are ‘strong’, which almost always means 
that the research evidence is ‘strong’, practitioners should 
simply ‘tell the patient what to do’. However, in the second 
case, when the recommendations are sufficiently ‘weak’, 
which once again almost always points to weak or 
equivocal research evidence, the practitioner may consider 
invoking shared decision-making [43]. GRADE also 
suggests that ‘strong’ recommendations, as opposed to 
‘weak’ recommendations, be used as quality indicators for 
healthcare policy enforcement. Although the GRADE 
system allows for criteria other than clinical research 
evidence, such as patient values and preferences, resource 
availability and cost, as a framework largely crafted by 
epidemiologists and methodologists it can be seen as an 
attempt to subsume the social processes involved at all 
levels of decision-making into a research driven 
framework.      
Multiple studies and analyses have been devoted to the 
issue of practitioner adherence to practice guidelines and 
the lack thereof [25]. Similarly, studies have attempted to 
assess guideline adherence through such means as audits of 
patient care using national registries [39] and changes in 
clinical parameters in the presence and absence of specific 
guideline implementation efforts [44] and have largely 
yielded negative or only marginally positive results.  An 
interesting series of ethnographic investigations has raised 
the question  of whether fidelity to guidelines is being 
assessed in the right way [45]. It also provides an example 
of what use of clinical research and guidelines may look 
like in a socially healthy practice setting. Gabbay and Le 
May [45] used qualitative research methods in two clinic 
settings in the UK, one community and one university-
based, for the purpose of studying how practitioners use 
and share research information in their day to day practice. 
They selected the study sites as clinics constituting the 
highest quality practices in their regions and which had 
won numerous awards and citations for excellent quality of 
care [46].  
The investigators found that both clinics maintained a 
vibrant culture of social interaction characterized by 
regular meetings involve all of the professional staff as 
well as frequent informal conversations. In the course of 
these interactions, problematical cases were discussed as 
well as other practice issues. In that context, current 
guidelines were mentioned from time to time. The 
practitioners who were interviewed espoused familiarity 
with guidelines through their professional journals and 
other materials. However, at no time did the investigators 
observe practitioners undertaking formal direct access to 
research or even to clinical guidelines, despite the fact that 
electronic access to such was readily available. Rather, 
such information entered into the socially constructed 
framework that Gabbay and Le May came to call 
“mindlines”, a construct that they consider to be analogous 
in a social context of what have been called “illness 
scripts” within the context of individual practitioner 
cognition [47]. Gabbay and Le May provide a window on a 
very different world of dialogue and concerted actions 
from that of the highly regimented environment suggested 
by GRADE. Although we don’t know how the clinics they 
studied would have fared in the published assessments of 
guideline use, what we do know is that the health 
professionals within them believed themselves to be 
adequately informed by such instruments and by the 





If the policies, practices and social processes that define 
healthcare in today’s Society reflect the collective wisdom 
of the culture in which they are embedded, then research of 
all kinds must provide nourishment and renewal to that 
wisdom. To further draw upon our metaphor, just as 
important as the nourishment that the tree receives is that 
which the tree, directly and indirectly, gives back to the 
soil. Nonetheless, an evolutionary hierarchy is evident; the 
tree cannot be derived from the soil through a simple step 
by step formula. Similarly, within healthcare, facts derived 
from the outcomes of clinical research cannot themselves 
generate practice, either singly or through attempts to 
reduce the wisdom of practice to fact. But, if the factual 
soil is contaminated or falsified, healthcare itself will 
ultimately degenerate to mindless obeisance to tradition.  
Detoxification of the clinical research environment, 
once contaminated, is challenging. Processes extending 
from outside the healthcare system will likely be required 
to remedy subterfuge and misrepresentation of research 
findings for gain. As for challenges such as multi-
morbidities that go to the heart of research design, it is the 
soil that needs to be enriched by the fruit of the tree. For 
example, researchers and guideline developers need to pay 
much more attention to the perceived needs for 
information and guidance on the part of practitioners and 
systems of healthcare delivery than they have heretofore. 
The movement to involve patient and practitioner 
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stakeholders in research and guideline efforts is proceeding 
well internationally and in the right direction. However, 
the point of entrance of stakeholders into the research and 
policy arena is still relatively downstream from the point of 
origin of such efforts. The gaps will remain refractory to 
the creativity of researchers and the complex algorithms of 
rationalist guideline efforts until the relevant social 
processes can be brought into a closer approximation to the 
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